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Abstract
The number of preferential trade agreements has greatly increased over the past
two decades, yet most existing bilateral arrangements take the form of free trade areas,
and less than ten percent can be considered to be fully °edged customs unions. This
paper develops a political economy model of trade policy under imperfect competition
to provide a positive explanation for the prevalence of free trade areas. In a three{
country setting, a representative from each prospective member is elected to determine
the tari®s to be applied on imported goods. Under a customs union, the necessity
to coordinate tari®s leads voters to strategically delegate power to more protectionist
representatives. Contrary to most of the existing literature, we show that strategic del-
egation may imply that free trade areas increase welfare compared to customs unions.
Moreover, the model also indicates that free trade areas are more likely to be politically
viable than customs unions.
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In the last two decades the world economy has witnessed an impressive increase in the
number of preferential trade agreements that entered into force. Interestingly, as reported
by the World Trade Organization,1 ninety percent of the agreements in force as of April 2008
take the form of free trade areas or other limited scope agreements, while only ten percent
are represented by customs unions (see Figure 1). Although these ¯gures clearly indicate
that free trade areas are more popular than customs unions, to the best of our knowledge the
literature so far has not o®ered a systematic explanation for this stylized fact. The aim of
this paper is to develop a political economy model of trade policy determination to explain
the formation of preferential trade arrangements and to compare the social welfare e®ects
and political viability of free trade areas (FTAs) and customs unions (CUs).
A large literature has studied the e®ects of the formation of preferential trade agreements.
In particular, several recent contributions have focused on the comparison of social welfare
under a free trade area and a customs union. Ornelas (2007) uses an oligopolistic competition
model to show that customs unions raise social welfare relative to free trade areas in member
countries. He is also able to show that the existence of a customs union can be thought of
as a building block towards global free trade, as it decreases the status quo welfare of non{
members, and thus makes the global free trade option more attractive for them. Saggi (2006)
uses a similar setup to show once again that customs unions raise social welfare relative to
free trade areas in member countries. Di®erently from Ornelas (2007), using a repeated
game framework, he concludes that customs unions and free trade areas can be thought of
as stumbling blocs for multilateral liberalization. Interestingly, this result arises because
in an FTA the non{members willingness to cooperate on multilateral tari® liberalization
declines, while in a CU members are less willing to cooperate. Notice that trade policies in
both Ornelas (2007) and Saggi (2006) are chosen to maximize social welfare.
Other papers investigate the political viability of free trade areas. Grossman and Helpman
(1995) and Krishna (1998) show that welfare reducing free trade areas are politically viable
in economic settings where pressure groups are important determinants of the free trade
1See: http : ==www:wto:org=english=tratop e=region e=region e:htm:Figure 1: Preferential Trading Arrangements by type (April 2008)
area formation process. Key to these results is the assumption that tari®s on non-member
countries are frozen at the pre-formation levels. On the contrary, Ornelas (2005a) shows that
if post-formation external tari®s are endogenously determined, then the political viability of
welfare reducing free trade areas is critically undermined even in the presence of pressure
groups. In this case, he shows that the government may end up not endorsing welfare
enhancing free trade areas but, at the same time, cannot endorse welfare reducing ones
when pressure groups do not in°uence the government's decision to create a free trade area.2
To analyze the political desirability of a free trade area and of a customs union, we
develop a simple three{country model, in which two potential members strategically inter-
act to choose the tari® levels to be implemented vis µ a vis each other and the rest of the
world, whereas the rest of the world implements most-favored-nation tari®s. The underlying
oligopolistic economic structure has been used in several analyses of regionalism (Ornelas
2005b, Ornelas 2007, Freund 2000 and Krishna 1998 among others) and in particular it al-
lows countries which are `small' from the point of view of world income, to in°uence their
import prices because markets are segmented and ¯rms are price setters. Importantly, in this
setting, it is impossible for a country to bene¯t directly from the reduction in tari®s towards
2Facchini and Testa (2008) investigate the political economy of the formation of common markets. They
conclude that politically viable common markets must enhance the protection received by some factors of
production. Thus, they argue that there exists an intrinsic tension between social desirability and market
integration.
2the partner country brought about by the agreement. At the same time, a country can be
made better o® by allowing the partner's exporters to enjoy the gains from (distortionary)
trade diversion in its own market if the preferential access granted to the partner is the result
of preferential access received from the partner.
Building upon this structure, in order to model the choice of a preferential trading ar-
rangement, we consider a representative democracy framework in which the policy maker
is chosen in each country among all citizens, and the elected representative is unable to
commit ex-ante to a given policy. This approach has been previously used by Laussel and
Riezman (2005) and Willmann (2005) to analyze the endogenous formation of trade policy,
and has allowed to highlight the important role played by strategic delegation in shaping pol-
icy outcomes.3 Our analysis shows that strategic delegation is also key to understanding the
likelihood of two countries forming a preferential agreement, and of the nature of the agree-
ment that will emerge in equilibrium. Although the focus of our analysis is on delegation
within a country in the presence of heterogeneous agents, in an early contribution Gatsios
and Karp (1991) have considered the role of strategic delegation between countries within a
customs union. In particular, they have shown that in a setting where the rest of the world
acts strategically, one member country may want to delegate to the other member country
the authority to set the common external tari® of the customs union, depending on whether
the policies followed by member and non member countries are strategic complements or
substitutes.
To carry out our analysis we consider a four{stage game. In the ¯rst stage, each potential
member country holds a sequence of referenda to decide whether a non{discriminatory MFN
trade policy, a free trade area or a customs union will be implemented. In the second
stage, voters in each country elect a representative who will choose the tari® level vis µ a
vis the rest of the world in the third stage of the game. The emerging trade policy is
non{discriminatory under the MFN regime, while free trade will instead prevail between
3This idea has been applied in a variety of other contexts. For instance, Schelling (1956) has pointed
out the potential gains for a principal to delegate decision making power to an agent who is \tougher"
than himself. Jones (1989) and Segendor® (1998) have formalized this idea in a general bargaining setting.
Conconi, Facchini and Zanardi (2008) have applied it to analyze the working of fast track authority in the
US congress.
3members of the preferential trade agreement with or without coordination of the external
tari®s depending on the nature of the agreement. In the fourth stage, ¯rms compete in
quantities, taking as given the trade policy that has been set during the third stage.
Ownership of the oligopolistic ¯rm is unevenly distributed among the citizenry, and in our
setting the individual with the median ownership share turns out to be the pivotal player.
Assuming that the median voter receives a fraction of the pro¯ts that is lower than the
fraction accrued to the average citizen, we are able to relate the distribution of income in a
particular country to the choice of trade regime. Notice that in our model a representative
cannot commit to choose a tari® level that di®ers from his most preferred one. Thus, in
general, representatives will choose tari®s that do not necessarily maximize social welfare,
and the median voter will take this into account in selecting the country's representative.
The supply side of the model presents geographically specialized production patterns,
since each prospective member country produces di®erent subsets of ¯nal goods. This as-
sumption allows us to establish several interesting results. In particular, we ¯nd that the
necessity to coordinate tari®s in customs unions leads voters to strategically delegate power
to more protectionist representatives. This result is not true for free trade area formation.
In contrast to the literature, we are also able to show that strategic delegation may lead to
a situation in which free trade areas raise welfare relative to customs unions if the degree of
income inequality is su±ciently small. Moreover, in our model, free trade areas raise wel-
fare relative to the MFN regime independently of the distribution of income, while customs
unions decrease welfare relative to the MFN regime if the degree of income inequality is
su±ciently small.
We also investigate the political viability of preferential trade agreements. In the ¯rst
stage of the game, each prospective member country holds a sequence of referenda to decide
whether a free trade area, a customs union or a non{discriminatory MFN policy will be
implemented. The political viability of preferential agreements depends on how they a®ect
the median voter's indirect utility function. Since the median voter receives a share of pro¯ts
lower than the average share of pro¯ts distributed in society, pro¯ts derived from high tari®s
are less important for political viability than for social welfare. We conclude that customs
4unions are not politically viable independently of the distribution of income, while free trade
areas are politically viable if income inequality is su±ciently low. Moreover, the results
indicate that only welfare-enhancing free trade areas are politically viable. These results
are robust to the introduction of asymmetries in the size of the market in the non-member
country, as well as to di®erences in the distribution of income across member countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce the model and
determine the equilibrium prices and quantities taking as given the tari® levels implemented
by each country. In Section 3 we determine the equilibrium tari® levels under di®erent
trade policy regimes, and compare the social welfare e®ects of the di®erent preferential trade
agreements. In Section 4 we examine the political viability of the di®erent preferential trade
arrangements, while in section 5 we extend our analysis by introducing asymmetries in the
size of member and non member countries, as well as in the income distribution across
countries. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
To analyze the formation of a preferential trade agreement, we employ a standard
oligopolistic trade model that has been used in several analyses of regionalism (Ornelas
2005b, Ornelas 2007, Freund 2000 and Krishna 1998). In particular, we consider a three{
country, three{good setting, where country A and B are prospective members, while country
F is an aggregate entity that stands for the rest of the world. Good 0 is a basic good that
is produced in all three countries, using only labor according to the identity production
technology X0 = L0. This good is freely traded and serves as the num¶ eraire. As a result,
if this good is produced in equilibrium, wages will be equal to 1. Goods 1 and 2 are in-
stead produced by duopolies with one ¯rm being located in country F, and the second in
member country A (good 1) and member country B (good 2) respectively.4 The two goods
are produced using labor and a sector speci¯c input according to a constant returns to scale
production function, which gives rise to a constant marginal cost of production c (in terms
4We will relax this assumption in section 5.
5of the num¶ eraire). Oligopolistic ¯rms compete in quantities (Cournot competition).
Introducing notation that will prove useful later on, let xi
s;d denote the quantity of good i
produced in country s and consumed in country d. Our geographically specialized production
pattern implies that x1
B;d = x2
A;d = 0. Each country can apply tari®s on trade with its
partners unless a preferential trade agreement is in place.5 Denote by ts;d the tari® applied
by country d in fF;A;Bg on imports from country s in fF;A;Bg, where clearly td;d = 0.
Country d's tari® matrix is described by td = (tA;d;tB;d;tF;d). The tari®s applied by the
various countries can be denoted more synthetically in matrix form by t =(tF;tA;tB) where
the tari® on products traded between PTA members is zero, as are the elements on the
diagonal.
The population in each country consists of a continuum of individuals of mass one. Each
individual supplies one unit of labor, but individuals di®er in the stake they own in the
speci¯c factor employed by the pro¯table duopolists. We denote by °s;l the fraction of the
oligopolistic sector's pro¯ts allocated to individual l in country s. We assume that the
oligopolistic sector's distribution of pro¯ts is the same in countries A and B. Without loss of
generality, we index individuals in ascending order, and normalize the fraction of the pro¯t
that is received by the average voter to one (° = 1). Typical wealth distributions then
imply that °m 6 1 (Alesina and Rodrik 1994). Following Dutt and Mitra (2002), °m can
be considered an inverse index of inequality { or an index of equality in the distribution of
assets.
Preferences are identical across countries and individuals and can be described by the










where ui(:) = Hxi¡ xi2
2 , implying that the demand for goods 1 and 2 are linear and take the
form xi = H ¡ pi. The assumptions used on the supply side and demand side of the model
5If a preferential trade agreement is in place and member countries' external tari®s are di®erent, then we
assume that rules of origin are applied to prevent the duty free trans{shipment of goods between countries
A and B.
6imply that markets for goods 1 and 2 are segmented, i.e. prices in country s are not a®ected
by tari®s imposed by country d.














































s;d, allocated to individual s in country l. The third term
captures tari® revenues which are lump sum rebated to each individual, and the fourth
describes instead consumer surplus.
We consider a four stage game among the three countries where di®erent trade policy
regimes can be chosen by country A and B. In the ¯rst stage, each perspective member holds
a sequence of referenda to choose between a non{discriminatory \most-favored-nation" trade
policy, a free trade area or a customs union. In the second stage, the population of each
country elects a representative who will, in the third stage, decide the countries' tari® policy.
If no preferential agreement is in place, each country's representative will choose the non
discriminatory tari®s to be applied on all trade. If a preferential agreement is in place,
then the representatives of countries A and B decide tari®s on country F. In this case, the
formation of a free trade area does not require cooperation between elected representatives to
decide tari®s on country F , whereas we follow the literature in assuming that the formation
of a customs union does. In stage four, ¯rms compete in quantities, taking as given the trade
policy that has been set during the third stage. We solve the model by backward induction,
starting at stage four.
2.1 Fourth Stage: Production and Consumption Choices
In the fourth stage of the model, ¯rms make production choices taking as given the
tari® matrix t. If a preferential agreement between countries A and B is in place, then
ti
AB = ti
BA = 0 for all i. Otherwise, countries apply MFN tari®s on imports. Notice that
7country F always applies MFN tari®s on goods imported from countries A and B. The
application of a MFN tari® on goods imported from countries A and B does not a®ect the
equilibrium in these two countries, since markets are segmented in this model. Thus, country
F's trade policy does not change throughout the analysis. This allows us to focus on the
equilibrium outcomes in countries A and B.
In general terms, country s' ¯rm producing good i solves the following problem with














where to save on notation we have omitted the fact that quantities and prices are a function









d = c + t
i
s;d for all d (3)
Focusing on country A (a similar analysis applies to B) and using our assumption of

















Thus, a ¯rm's sales in country A di®er from its competitors' sales according to the di®erence






















































where we assume that H > c. As is clear from expressions (5), the price of good 1 and 2 in
8A depends only on the trade policies adopted by that country and does not depend instead
on the trade policy adopted by any other country, i.e. markets are segmented.
3 Second and Third Stages: Determining Tari® Policy
In this section we determine the trade policy chosen by the elected representatives of
the two prospective member countries, and the identity of the representative. We consider
di®erent scenarios with respect to trade policy determination. We start by analyzing the
non{cooperative scenarios (MFN and FTA) in which country A and B set non{cooperatively
their policy vis µ a vis the rest of the world and compare the resulting levels of protection. We
turn next to the analysis of the cooperative outcome (CU) and compare then welfare across
the di®erent trade policy regimes.
3.1 Non{cooperative trade policies
Our representative democracy framework calls for the population of each country to
elect a citizen who will choose the tari® level to be applied on imports from other countries.
The objective of each representative is then to ¯nd tari®s that maximize his own welfare,
given the tari®s chosen by other countries. We represent the share of the representative's
pro¯t by using `hats' and continue focusing our analysis on country A. The representative's
problem is given by:
max
tA
v (t;b °A) (6)
where the indirect utility function is described in (2). The di®erence between the MFN and
the FTA regimes is that in the former the tari®s applied on imports do not depend on the
good's country of origin, while if A is part of an FTA with B, imports from B are allowed
to enter free of duty. Assuming that an interior solution exists6, the tari® vector chosen by
representative ^ °A is given by
tA = tA(^ °A; ^ °B) (7)
6See Helpman (1997) for details.
9in other words, the tari® vector chosen by the representative in country A depends on his
identity and potentially also on the identity of the other country's representative. Who will
serve as the country's representative in the determination of trade policies? Our hypothesis
allows us to invoke the median voter theorem to answer this question. in particular, the
median voter's second stage problem is given by:
max
b °A
v (t(b °A;b °B);°
m
A) (8)
We are now ready to establish our ¯rst result:
Lemma 1 If trade policies are set non{cooperatively, strategic delegation does not arise in
equilibrium. Furthermore, if an FTA is formed, tari®s applied to non member countries are
(weakly) lower than under a MFN arrangement.
Proof. Focusing on country A, we start by solving, for a given representative ^ °A, the MFN
















































where we used the fact that x1
B;A = x2
A;A = 0. Using the equilibrium price and quantities




(H ¡ c)(1 + 2b °A)







From (10) it is clear that the choice of tari® in country A does not depend on the identity
of country B's representative.
Turning now to the choice of the country's representative under a MFN policy, the ¯rst







































@b °A = 0. Moreover,



























We can substitute t
MFN;1
A as described in (10) which yields
b °A = °
m
A
In other words, the median voter in each country does not delegate power. The equilibrium












and similar expressions apply to country B. Thus, our geographically specialized production













(H ¡ c)(2b °A + 1)







and similar expressions apply to country B. We turn next to the identi¯cation of each mem-
11ber country's representative under an FTA. Following the expressions in (13) and applying
the same rationale applied to the MFN case, it is straightforward to show that
b °A = °
m
A
Thus, once again the median voter in each country does not delegate power. The equilibrium





















F;B . Comparing equation 14 and 12 thus immediately establishes the second
part of the result.
For future reference, note that the tari® applied on imports of good 1 is increasing in °m
in the MFN and FTA situations. This implies that the tari® on imports of good 1 decreases
in the extent of inequality. This is because less inequality means that the median owns a
higher share of the domestic ¯rm and hence has more interest in a higher tari®.
The intuition for the ¯rst part of the lemma 1 is as follows. In our model, markets
for goods 1 and 2 are segmented, and as a result the equilibrium prices in country A bare
no relationship to the equilibrium prices in country B. Moreover, in this non-cooperative
setting, tari®s applied by country A can di®er from the tari®s applied by country B. Clearly,
the median voter does better by simply representing her own interests, because she has no
in°uence on the partner's decision in this case.
As for the second part of the lemma 1, the decline in the tari® applied to the non{
produced good in the FTA compared to the MFN is related to the distortionary e®ects
generated by the preferential access granted to the partner country. In other words, the
median voter is able to attenuate the degree of trade diversion generated by the preferential
access granted to the partner country by lowering the external tari® when moving from the
MFN situation to the FTA situation. This is what is known in the literature as \the tari®
12complementarity e®ect" (Ornelas 2007).7 Finally, notice that the e®ect of trade policy on
the partner's ¯rm is not internalized in the non-cooperative solution. We turn next to the
study of cooperative preferential agreements.
3.2 Cooperative trade policies
The main feature of customs unions is that member countries coordinate their external
trade policies and apply common external tari®s. In this case, we follow most of the liter-
ature8 by interpreting tari® coordination in customs union as a cooperative solution to the
choice of member countries' common external tari®s. Following this line of argument, the
choice of external tari®s is the solution to the following problem
max
ti v (t;b °A) + v (t;b °B) for i = f1;2g (15)
where ^ °A and ^ °B are the elected representatives in the two countries and now tari®s applied
on trade with country F are equal (ti = ti
F;A = ti
F;B) across countries, but not necessarily
across sectors. The resulting tari® vector chosen is given by
t
CU = t
CU(^ °A; ^ °B) (16)
As before, in the second stage of the model, the representatives will be chosen by the median











We are then able to establish our second result
7Estevadeordal, Freund and Ornelas (2008) ¯nd strong support for the presence of this e®ect in their
empirical study of preferential trading arrangements in Latin America.
8Ornelas (2007) and Saggi (2006) model the choice of common external tari®s to maximize the aggregate
welfare of the countries. In this case, the representative voter would correspond to the average voter in
our paper. In a model with strategic delegation,Willmann (2005) assumes that legislators maximize their
aggregate welfare when choosing the most-favored-nation tari®s for a small economy. Similarly, Grossman
and Helpman (2005) assume that the legislative majority maximizes its aggregate welfare when choosing
most-favored-nation tari®s for a small economy.
13Lemma 2 If trade policy is set cooperatively, strategic delegation occurs, and the elected
representative is an individual with an ownership share in the import competing ¯rm twice
that of the median voter.
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rium. Using (5), we can obtain the following expressions for the tari® levels:
t
CU;1 =
(H ¡ c)(1 + 2b °A)




(H ¡ c)(1 + 2b °B)
(11 ¡ 2b °B)
It is clear from (19) that the greater the share of pro¯ts received by the elected representa-
tives, the higher the tari® applied on trade with non-members.
Turning now to the selection of the representative, the ¯rst order condition of problem
17 is given by
@v
¡







where we used @tCU;2
@b °A = 0 following (19). We know that @tCU;1
@b °A 6= 0 using expression (19),
which implies that equation (20) yields @v
@tCU;1 = 0. Substituting equilibrium conditions (5)
into equation (20) yields the following:




Substituting tCU;1 from (19) we have that
b °A = 2°
m (22)
14The intuition for lemma 2 works as follows. In the case of customs unions, the bene¯ts
of implementing a tari® on imports of good 1 accrue to country A while the costs of the
tari® are equally shared between the member countries. However, cooperative tari® setting
forces the representatives to internalize the negative externalities on country B from a tari®
imposed on imports of good 1. Anticipating this cooperative outcome, the median voter in
country A is better o® by delegating power to a representative who is more protectionist
than herself.
We can substitute the relationship in (22) into expression (19) to ¯nd the common ex-
ternal tari®s and obtain that
t
CU;1 =





(H ¡ c)(4°m + 1)
(11 ¡ 4°m)
In contrast to the other regimes we have considered so far, the tari® on the good not
produced domestically in a CU also depends on the identity of a representative, namely the
representative of the partner country. Note that both tari®s are increasing in °m, i.e. they
decrease in the extent of inequality for similar reasons as before.
3.3 Welfare Comparison
In this section, we compare the welfare levels that can be achieved in the three possible
trade policy scenarios we have considered. By comparing the right hand side of equations
(14) and (23), it is clear that the common external tari®s under a customs union are higher
than the external tari®s in an FTA, independently of the distribution of income, since they
both depend on the median voter's share of economic pro¯ts. This result is well known,
and has been obtained before for instance by Freund (2000) and Ornelas (2007). However,
lemmas 1 and 2 indicate that the median voter strategically delegate power in the case of
customs unions but does delegate power in the case of free trade areas. Since representatives
seek to maximize their own interest when choosing external tari®s, this might lead to a
15change in overall welfare when moving from free trade areas to customs unions.
In constructing our welfare measure in both countries we weight equally the utility of all
individuals, and thus use the average voter's indirect utility function, v (t;°).9 Using the
external tari®s described by expressions (14) and (23), and applying equilibrium price and






























A;F does not change since markets are segmented, and, therefore, equilibrium prices
in country F do not depend on the trade policy implemented by countries A and B. The








if the di®erence between
the fraction of pro¯ts received by the median voter and by the average voter is su±ciently
small. In particular, we are able to show that
Proposition 1 Free trade areas raise member countries' welfare relative to customs unions
as long as the fraction of pro¯ts received by the median voter °m 2 (0;° = 1) exceeds a
critical level ~ °m
FTA;CU.

















Assuming that °m > 0, then the solution to 208°m3¡3432°m2+12947°m¡7986 = 0 indicates








. It is easy to show that only one root
is between zero and one: °m = 0.7646 (see Appendix A for details of the calculations).
Thus, for 0:7646 = ~ °m


















The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows. Equation (2) indicates that aggregate
welfare can be described as the sum of factor income, tari® revenues and consumer surplus.
Since common external tari®s are higher than external tari®s in an FTA, consumer surplus
9See also Facchini, Lorz and Willmann (2006).
16(pro¯ts) is lower (higher) in a customs union than in an FTA. In principle, the comparison
of the sum of these two terms yields ambiguous results, but it can be shown (see Appendix
A) that the sum of consumer surplus and pro¯ts is higher in customs unions than FTAs.
Comparing tari® revenue to the sum of consumer surplus and pro¯t is thus key to explaining
Proposition 1: If the degree of inequality is low, that is °m 2 (~ °m
FTA;CU;1), then the common
external tari®s are high enough to lead to a substantially low level of imports from non-
members. In this case, the tari® revenue in a customs union is su±ciently lower than in an
FTA as to make member countries' welfare decrease when moving from an FTA to a CU.
Before investigating the political viability of FTAs and customs unions, it is important
to understand the changes in welfare when moving from a regime where MFN tari®s are
applied to a regime where a preferential trade agreement between A and B is in place. Using
external tari®s described by expressions (12) in lemma 1 and applying equilibrium prices










¡1301 + 380°m + 12°m2´
16(11 ¡ 2°m)
2 (25)
We can use expressions (24) and (25) to establish the following result:
Proposition 2 The creation of a free trade area raises member countries' welfare relative
to the MFN regime, regardless of the fraction of pro¯ts received by the median voter °m 2
(0;1). Furthermore, if the share of pro¯ts received by the median voter exceeds a critical level
~ °m
CU;MFN 2 (~ °m
FTA;CU;1), then a customs union decreases member countries' welfare relative
to the MFN regime. Finally, if °m 2 (~ °m
FTA;CU; ~ °m
CU;MFN) then a customs union welfare
dominates the MFN regime but is dominated by an FTA.










1936 > 0. Thus, it is positive inde-















2 . The solution to ¡11011¡21780°m+









. As discussed in Appendix B, only one of the solutions is between zero and
17one: °m = 0.8874. Thus, for 0:8874 = ~ °m


















Continuing to use country A's point of view to explain our results, the welfare comparison
between the FTA and the MFN regimes can be understood in the following way. Lemma 1
shows that country A's MFN tari® on good 1 is equal under both scenarios, and country B
does not produce good 1. Thus, there are no welfare di®erences related to the consumption
of good 1 in country A. The pro¯ts of the ¯rm producing good 1 in country A increase since
it has preferential access to country B's market after the formation of the FTA. At the same
time, country A just relies on imports to meet its demand of good 2. Lemma 1 indicates
that country A's MFN tari® on good 2 is higher than its tari® when an FTA is in place.
Moreover, country B's ¯rm has duty free access to country A's market when an FTA is in
place. Then, it can be easily shown (see Appendix B) that the gains in consumer surplus
obtained from the FTA formation are lower than the losses in tari® revenue. However, the
pro¯ts increase of the ¯rm that produces good 1 in country A more than compensates for
the welfare losses in the market for good 2. Thus, Proposition 2 shows that an FTA raises
the welfare of member countries with respect to the MFN regime.
The analysis of changes in welfare due to the formation of customs unions follows along
the lines of Proposition 1. The common external tari® applied on imports of good 1 is higher
than the MFN tari® applied on imports of this good by country A. Thus, the price of good
1 is higher in country A when a customs union is in place than under the MFN regime.
In this case, one can show that the sum of consumer surplus and pro¯ts related to good 1
is higher when a customs union is in place. In the case of good 2, prices can be higher or
lower depending on the degree of inequality. The sum of consumer surplus and pro¯ts across
goods is positive, independently of the level of inequality. Then, changes in tari® revenue are
again key to explain the result. If the degree of inequality is low, that is °m 2 (^ °
m
CU;MFN;1),
then the common external tari®s are su±ciently higher than MFN tari®s and lead to a
substantial fall in the quantity imported from country F compared to the MFN level. The
latter generates a decrease in tari® revenues and in welfare, when member countries move
from the status quo to a customs union.
184 First Stage: Political Viability of PTAs
In this section, we focus on the ¯rst stage of our model to study the political economy
of preferential trade agreements. Each member country holds a sequence of referenda to
decide whether an FTA, a customs union or a non{discriminatory MFN regime should be
implemented. We start by considering a referendum in which each country is called upon to
choose between the MFN regime and the formation of an FTA. Once the outcome of this
referendum is known, the polity is asked to choose between the result of the ¯rst referendum
and a deeper form of integration, namely a Customs Union.10
If countries A and B decide to form a preferential agreement, then voters choose the
representative that will decide trade tari®s as described in the previous section. Otherwise,
the MFN trade policy remains in place. The set-up of the problem allows us to conclude
that the median voter is pivotal in the referendum process.
Since the decision to form a preferential agreement is simultaneous, then an FTA (CU) is
established if fFTA, FTAg (fCU, CUg) is a Nash equilibrium of this game. The possibility of
choosing di®erent preferential agreements may lead to an equilibrium that is not \politically
e±cient", i.e. a trade regime that is not the preferred regime according to median voters'
preferences, but one that emerges as a political equilibrium due to the lack of coordination
across countries over the choice of trade regime. To deal with this issue, let us ¯rst de¯ne
the following concept:
De¯nition 1 A preferential trade agreement is politically viable if the median voter prefers
it over the MFN regime.
Political viability of preferential agreements is measured using the median voter's indirect
utility function, v (t;°m). We continue using the point of view of country A to study the
equilibrium of the game. A similar analysis applies to country B. Using external tari®s
described by expressions (12), (14), and (23), and applying the equilibrium price and quantity
10Alternatively, we could start by considering the decision between the MFN arrangement and a CU and
then, in the second stage, pit against each other the winner vs. an FTA. The two sequences deliver the same
¯nal outcome.
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We are now ready to state our ¯rst result characterizing the conditions under which a
free trade area will emerge as a political equilibrium.
Proposition 3 The formation of a free trade area will be preferred over the MFN regime if
the share of pro¯ts received by the median voter °m 2 (0;1) exceeds a critical level ¸ °
m
FTA;MFN.























0:3259 = ¸ °
m
FTA;MFN < °m < 1.
Proposition 3 says that an FTA is politically viable if the level of inequality is su±ciently
small. What is the intuition behind this result? We can write the change in the median


































where `¢0 represents the change in variables from the MFN regime to a preferential
agreement and tMFN;tPTA represent respectively the tari® matrixes in the MFN regime and
when a preferential trading arrangement has been introduced. The second term on the right-
hand-side of expression (27) highlights the importance of pro¯t changes when comparing the
di®erent trade regimes. Using the external tari®s described by expressions (12), (14) and
(23), and applying equilibrium price and quantity described in expressions (5), allow us to












































Equation (27) indicates that the median voter's indirect utility is positively correlated
with changes in social welfare and negatively correlated to changes in the product of pro¯ts
and inequality. Expression (27) makes clear that increases in pro¯ts relative to the MFN
regime are not as important on political grounds as they are on welfare grounds since the
median voter receives a share of pro¯ts which is lower than the average. Proposition 2
established that an FTA raises social welfare relative to the MFN regime. This implies that
the ¯rst term on the right-hand-side of expression (27) is positive. Furthermore, we also
know from proposition 2 that this term does not depend on the extent of inequality.
As for the second term, we know from the previous sections that an FTA raises pro¯ts
relative to the MFN regime. Expressions (28) can be used to conclude that the increase in
pro¯ts generated by the creation of an FTA relative to the MFN regime is equal to
135(H¡c)2
1936 .
Thus, this increase does not depend on the extent of inequality. This is true since lemma 1
indicates that the MFN and FTA tari®s applied by country A on good 1 are the same, and
the tari®s applied by country B on good 1 under the MFN and FTA regimes do not depend
on the extent of inequality (see expressions (12) and (14)). Since the di®erence between the
average and the median ownership share is also positive, the second term on the right-hand-
side of equation (27) is positive. In this case, the product of the extent of inequality and
change of pro¯ts, which corresponds to the second term on the right-hand-side of equation
(27), decreases with °m. Taking into account the minus sign, and recalling that the ¯rst term
does not vary with °m, the change in the median voter's indirect utility is thus increasing in
°m, which establishes the result.
We are now in a position to consider the outcome of the vote between the MFN regime
21and the creation of a customs union. Our result in this case is summarized in the following
Proposition 4 A customs union will never win over the MFN regime.











°m²(0;1). The mathematical details of the proof can be found in Appendix C.
To understand the intuition behind this result, we can use once again the equivalent to
equation (27) applied in the context of the MFN and customs union regimes. Recall that
the common external tari®s under a customs union (see expressions (23)) are higher than
the MFN tari®s (see expressions (12)). Then, pro¯ts are higher under a customs union
than under the MFN regime, and, consequently, the second term on the right-hand-side of
expression (27) is positive. Taking into account the minus sign in front of the second term on
the right-hand-side of expression (27), we can conclude that the decrease in the importance
of pro¯t increases makes customs unions politically inviable.
In principle, the value of the median voter's indirect utility function could increase when
moving from the MFN regime to a customs union if social welfare increased su±ciently to
compensate for the negative e®ect created by the variation in pro¯ts. Proposition 2 shows
that the latter happens if the level of inequality is su±ciently high, i.e. °m ² (0; ~ °m
CU;MFN).
However, the second term on the right-hand-side of expression (27) also depends on the level
of inequality, and it can be shown that it may increase or decrease with changes in the level
of inequality (see Appendix C). The net e®ect is that the absolute value of the second term
on the right-hand-side exceeds the absolute value of the ¯rst term on the right-hand-side.
This explains the result described in Proposition 4.
Last, we consider the possibility that a referendum is called - when a free trade area has
been established - to deepen the extent of the integration and create a customs union. From
proposition 3 and 4 and using transitivity, it follows immediately that
Proposition 5 A customs union will never be preferred over a free trade area.
From our analysis, we can thus conclude that only the formation of an FTA is a politically
viable alternative to the MFN regime in our setting with representative democracy.
225 Extensions
In this section, we consider two important extensions of our analysis. First, we focus
on the e®ect of an increase in competition on the political viability of di®erent trade policy
arrangements by allowing the number of ¯rms active in F to be larger than one. Second, we
study the consequences of asymmetries in income distribution between prospective member
countries. While carrying out these exercises, we retain all other assumptions of the model.
5.1 Change in the number of ¯rms in country F
Let nF > 1 be the number of ¯rms in country F producing goods 1 and 2, while one























































F;A represents the quantity of good i produced by a ¯rm located in country F
and consumed in country A. Similar expressions apply to country B, where the di®erences
reside in the fact that country B does not produce good 1.
The solutions of the second and third stages of the model follow the same steps as in the
previous sections. It is easy to show that the results described in lemma 1 continue to be
valid since the representative of each country continues to be the median voter in the MFN
and FTA regimes, b ° = °m. Thus, the median voter does not delegate power in these two
23cases. Moreover, lemma 2 also applies in this case since we ¯nd the same level of strategic
delegation in the formation of customs unions, b ° = 2°m. This indicates that the level of
strategic delegation does not vary with the number of ¯rms in country F. The equilibrium
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(H ¡ c)(1 + 4°m)
3nF ¡ 4nF°m + 8
(32)
Notice that MFN and FTA tari®s are negatively related to the number of ¯rms in country
F. In the case of customs unions, tari®s may instead increase or decrease with the number
of ¯rms in country F. It is easy to show that if the level of inequality is relatively low
(0:75 < °m < 1), then tari®s increase when the number of ¯rms in country F increases.
Otherwise, tari®s decrease when the number of ¯rms in country F increases.
To gain some intuition for the relationship between tari®s under di®erent trade regimes
and the number of ¯rms in country F let us assume tari®s to be chosen to maximize social
welfare. We can use expressions (30), (31), and (32)11 to conclude that under this hypothesis,
there exists a negative relationship between tari®s and the number of ¯rms in country F.
Notice though that in our framework, the representative of each member country may not
correspond to the average voter and as a result, tari®s may not be chosen based on social
concerns.
In the MFN and FTA regimes, the fraction of pro¯ts received by the representative (me-
dian) voter is less than the fraction received by the average voter, since we have assumed
11In this case, the tari®s that maximize welfare in the MFN and FTA regimes can be found by replacing
°m = 1 in expressions (30) and (31). In the case of customs unions, we replace 2°m = 1 in expression (32).
24that °m < 1. Thus, increases in pro¯ts due to tari® increases are less important to the rep-
resentative voter than to the average voter. This explains the negative relationship between
tari®s and the number of ¯rms in country F in the MFN and FTA regimes. On the contrary,
the representative voter in customs unions may receive a fraction of pro¯ts greater than the
average voter. In this case, tari®s may increase or decrease depending on the fraction of
pro¯ts received by the representative voters. An increase in the number of ¯rms in country
F may increase the strategic gains provided by the common external tari®s, which may lead
to an increase in the common external tari®s if the representative voters receive a fraction of
pro¯ts signi¯cantly greater than the fraction received by the average voter (0:75 < °m < 1).12
We continue measuring the welfare level in member countries using the average voter's
indirect utility function, v (t;°). Using external tari®s derived in expressions (31) and (32),
and applying the equilibrium price and quantity obtained in expressions (29) we obtain the
following result:
Proposition 6 Free trade areas raise member countries' welfare relative to customs unions
as long as the fraction of pro¯ts received by the median voter °m ² (0;1) exceeds a critical
level ~ °m
FTA;CU(nF). As the number of ¯rms in country F increases, the lower is ~ °m
FTA;CU(nF).
The proof of Proposition 6 follows along the lines of Proposition 1 and requires us to









. The solution of this process yields the critical level ~ °m
FTA;CU(nF). Three
solutions emerge from this process but only one provides an answer compatible with 0 <
°m < 1. We have illustrated the relationship between ~ °m
FTA;CU and nF in ¯gure 2. The graph
shows that as the number of ¯rms in country F becomes larger, values of °m > 0:59 imply
that an FTA raises welfare relative to a customs unions. Using Propositions 1 and 6, we
can show that the critical value ~ °m
FTA;CU(nF) needed to ensure that an FTA raises welfare
relative to customs union satis¯es 0:59 < ~ °m
FTA;CU < 0:76. This implies that an increase in
the number of ¯rms in the rest of the world tends to make it more likely for an FTA to
welfare dominate a customs union in our model.








Figure 2: Increasing the number of ¯rms in the rest of the world
It is also important to understand how average welfare changes when we compare the
MFN regime with one in which a preferential trade agreement is in place between A and B.
We can conclude that:
Proposition 7 Free trade areas raise member countries' welfare relative to the MFN regime
regardless of the fraction of pro¯ts received by the median voter °m ² (0;1). Furthermore,
if the share of pro¯ts received by the median voter exceeds a critical level ~ °m
CU;MFN(nF) 2
(~ °m
FTA;CU(nF);1),then a customs union decreases member countries' welfare relative to the
MFN regime. As the number of ¯rms in country F increases, the lower is ~ °m
CU;MFN(nF).
The proof of Proposition 7 follows the same steps as the proof for Proposition 2. We








is positive for 0 <









yields a complex expression but simulations13 indicate that as










decreases. This exercise also indicates that as nF
grows bigger, the minimum cuto® for °m converges to 0:59 (and the picture would look very
similar to Figure 1). In general, Propositions 6 and 7 indicate that as the number of ¯rms










26in country F grows, so does the size of the parameter space guaranteeing that the FTA and
the MFN regimes are preferred on welfare grounds to the formation of a customs union.
Learning about the welfare e®ects of the formation of preferential agreements is desirable
but the implementation of preferential agreements depends on their political viability. As
before, the median voter is pivotal in the sequence of referenda and thus the political viability
of preferential agreements continues to be measured using the median voter's indirect utility
function, v (t;°m). Focusing on country A (the analysis for B is similar), using external
tari®s described by expressions (30), (31), and (32), and applying the equilibrium price and
quantity obtained in expressions (29), we can establish the following
Proposition 8 The formation of a customs union is not politically viable. On the other
hand, the formation of a free trade area will emerge as an equilibrium if the share of pro¯ts
received by the median voter °m ² (0;1) exceeds a critical value ¸ °
m
FTA;MFN(nF). As the
number of ¯rms in country F increases, the higher is ¸ °
m
FTA;MFN(nF).
The proof of Proposition 8 follows the same steps as the proof of Propositions 3, 4
































yields the expression ¡24¡17nF¡3n2
F+°m
A(80+48nF+7nF).

















The latter expression can be used to show that as the number of ¯rms in country F increases,
the higher is the critical value ¸ °
m
FTA;MFN so that a free trade area will emerge as an equilib-
rium. In general, Propositions 5-10 extend the results from previous sections by highlighting
once again the welfare desirability and political viability of FTA formation when the level of
inequality is relatively low.
5.2 Di®erences in income distribution
In this section, we consider the e®ect of asymmetries in the income distribution between
prospective member countries (°m
A 6= °m
B) on the formation of preferential trading arrange-











In this case, we could not ¯nd °m ² f0;1] that satis¯es that equality.
27ments. All other assumptions in the model are retained, and in particular that the number
of ¯rms in country F is equal to one. Our starting point is the investigation of whether
Propositions 1-2 continue to hold if °m
A 6= °m
B. For each member country, the analysis is
carried out in three steps. First, we consider the equilibrium in the market for good 1, then
the equilibrium in the market for good 2, and ¯nally exports to the partner country.
We will continue to take the point of view of country A. As seen before, country A's
representative corresponds to the median voter in both the MFN and FTA regime, i.e.
b °A = °m
A. Thus, the median voter does not delegate power in these two cases. Moreover, if a
customs unions is formed, strategic delegation occurs and b °A = 2°m
A. Furthermore, the level
of strategic delegation does not vary with the distribution of income in country B. These
results imply that lemmas 1 and 2 remain valid in this context.
The equilibrium in the market for good 1 in country A depends only on °m
A, whatever
trade regime is in place as indicated by expressions (10), (13), and (19). This implies that in
comparing trade regimes, the fact that °m
A 6= °m
B plays no role as far as the equilibrium in the
market for good 1 in country A is concerned. Similarly, exports of good 1 from country A to
country B do not depend on °m
B as described by expressions (10), (13), and (19). Therefore,
the di®erences in income inequality between the two countries play no role in this case as
well.
The same is not true for the determination of the equilibrium in the market for good 2
in country A. In fact, from equation (19) we can see that, whenever a customs union is in
place, the equilibrium price in that market depends on the distribution of income in country
B. This has implications for the welfare comparison of a customs unions and an FTA and
of a customs union and the MFN regime, which are summarized in the following
Proposition 9 Free trade areas raise member countries' welfare relative to the MFN regime
for any member countries' income distribution. For relatively high inequality levels, the lower
the share of pro¯ts received by the partner country's median voter, the lower the critical value
~ °m
A; FTA;CU (~ °m
A; CU;MFN) of the share of pro¯ts received by the country's median voter needed
for a customs union to raise welfare relative to the free trade area (MFN) situation. For
relatively low inequality levels, at least one of the member countries will be worse-o® after
28the customs union formation.








is the same one we calculated

















are complex expressions15 so we rely on simulations to obtain the other results described









, indicates that given °m
B 6 0:76 one can ¯nd a minimum °m
A ² (0; ~ °m
A; FTA;CU)
6 0:76 so that both countries can gain from the formation of a customs union. If one
of the member countries has substantially low income inequality levels (°m > 0:76), then
the partner country will always be worse-o® after the formation of a customs union. The
requirement related to the minimum level of inequality needed to form welfare-enhancing
customs unions (°m < 0:76) relates to the result from Propositions 1 and 2. As we have
argued before, if the degree of inequality is very low then the external tari®s are high enough
to generate signi¯cant losses of tari® revenue. This is key to explaining the result. A similar
rationale applies to the analysis of the comparison between a customs union and the MFN
regime.16
Turning to the political viability of preferential agreements, we need once again to focus on
the median voter's indirect utility function, v(t;°m). Following the same argument developed
to establish Propositions 3, 4 and 5, it is easy to show that the formation of free trade areas
is politically viable if the degrees of inequality are not extremely high, and in particular °m
² (~ °m
A; FTA;MFN = 0:3259; 1).
Similarly, we can determine the outcome of a referendum between the MFN and a cus-






. The resulting expression
is complex but simulations indicate that for a given °m




A; CU;MFN;1) for the customs union to be politically viable in country A. However, as
the same argument applies to country B, the customs union cannot emerge as a political
15In this case, simulations are carried out to calculate the minimum fraction of pro¯ts received by the
country's median voter needed to raise welfare in that country when a customs union is formed, given the
share of pro¯ts received by the partner country's median voter.
16In this case, a customs union can be welfare-enhancing for both members if the degrees of inequality are
not substantially low, °m < 0:88.
29equilibrium in this case.
Note that assuming that country F's economy is larger than countries A and B's economies
(as measured by the parameter H in the demand function) does not change the results de-
scribed in Propositions 1-5. This is true since the equilibrium quantities and prices do not
change in countries A and B, as can be seen in expressions (5), (30), (31), and (32).
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have developed a representative democracy model of the formation of a
preferential trading arrangement to provide a rationale for the greater popularity of free trade
areas over customs unions. Most of the existing literature ¯nds that, due to the presence
of tari® coordination, customs unions tend to raise welfare relative to free trade areas in
member countries. In this paper, we have shown that this does not need to be the case.
In particular we have found that if inequality is su±ciently small, an FTA raises welfare
relative to a customs union for the member countries. The intuition for this result is that
if income inequality is small, then voters elect very protectionist representatives when a
customs union is in place. The political process can then result in high common external
tari®s, which may be deleterious to welfare in member countries relative to the formation
of a free trade area. Our analysis thus highlights the importance of taking into account
the ex-ante income distribution in each country when we want to investigate the welfare
consequences of the formation of preferential trade arrangements.
We have also used our framework to study the political viability of free trade areas and
customs unions, and we have shown that FTAs are politically more viable than customs
unions. This is an important result, as it provides a new rationale for the relatively low
frequency of CU around the world. Once again, the political viability of FTAs depends on
the degree of income inequality. Our results suggests that FTAs are politically palatable if
the degree of income inequality is su±ciently small. Moreover, the results indicate that only
welfare enhancing preferential trade agreements are politically viable, because increases in
pro¯ts derived from preferential access are not as important on political grounds as they are
on welfare grounds. These ¯ndings are robust to changes in the market size of non-member
30countries and to di®erences in income inequality across member countries.
7 Appendix
7.1 Appendix A
In this appendix we proof proposition 1 in the main text of the paper. We can focus
on country A to explain the welfare comparison between the customs union and the FTA
situations. Using external tari®s described by expressions (14) and (23), and applying equi-
librium prices and quantities described in expressions (5), allow us to compare the welfare
levels between these two trade regimes. The sum of the changes in consumer surplus and
producer surplus when member countries move from an FTA to a customs union can be










8°m(3993 + 7502°m ¡ 2640°m2 + 160°m3)(c ¡ H)
2
121(121 ¡ 66°m + 8°m2)2 (33)
where ¢CSA represents the change in country A's consumer surplus. Expression (33)
indicates that comparison of the sum of these terms is equal to zero if 3993 + 7502°m ¡
2640°m2+160°m3 equals zero. The values of °m such that 3993+7502°m¡2640°m2+160°m3







than zero in the parameter space under investigation.
The change in tari® revenue when member countries move from an FTA to a customs
union is described by the following expression:
¢TRA =
8°m(¡27951 + 59290°m ¡ 16368°m2 + 992°m3)(c ¡ H)2
121(121 ¡ 66°m + 8°m2)2 (34)
where ¢TRA represents the change in country A's tari® revenue. Expression (34)
indicates that the tari® revenue does not change between FTAs and customs unions if
¡27951 + 59290°m ¡ 16368°m2 + 992°m3 equals zero. The values of °m such that this
expression equals zero are 0.55, 4.41, and 11.52. Thus, we can show that if °m > (<) 0:55
then tari® revenue in FTAs is greater (less) than in customs unions. In particular, if °m ²
31(0:76;1] then ¢TRA is su±ciently negative to generate the result that FTAs raise welfare
relative to customs unions as described in Proposition 1.
7.2 Appendix B
In this appendix we prove proposition 2. Let us start by comparing welfare levels under
the MFN and FTA regimes for country A (the analysis for country B is analogous). Using
the external tari®s described by expressions (12) and (14), and applying equilibrium prices
and quantities described in expressions (5), allow us to compare the welfare levels between
these two trade regimes. As explained in the main body of the paper, there are no welfare
di®erences related to the consumption of good 1 in country A. The increase in the pro¯ts of
the ¯rm that produces good 1 in country A due the formation of the FTA equals
135(c¡H)2
1936 ,
which can be calculated using expressions (28). In the case of good 2, the sum of the gains
in consumer surplus and the losses in tari® revenue with the FTA formation equals ¡
(c¡H)2
44 .
The summation of changes in pro¯ts, consumer surplus and tari® revenue equals
91(c¡H)2
1936 as
indicated in the proof of Proposition 2. Thus, Proposition 2 shows that an FTA raises the
welfare of member countries with respect to the MFN regime.
Let us turn now to the welfare comparison between the MFN and customs union regimes.
The sum of the changes in consumer surplus and producer surplus between the MFN and


















where ¢CSA represents the change in country A's consumer surplus. Expression (35) indi-
cates that comparison of the sum of these terms is equal to zero if 34485 ¡ 33396°m +
22756°m2 ¡ 5280°m3 + 320°m4 equals zero. The real values of °m such that 34485 ¡







is greater than zero in the parameter space under investigation.







8(121 ¡ 66°m+8°m2)2 (36)
where ¢TRA represents the change in country A's tari® revenue. Expression (36) indicates
that the tari® revenue does not change between the status quo and customs unions if 11737¡
27588°m + 36404°m2 ¡ 9504°m3 + 576°m4 equals zero. There are no values of °m ² (0;1]
such that this expression equals zero. This ¯nding di®ers from the discussion on Appendix
A about the e®ects of customs union formation on tari® revenue, since tari®s in the MFN
regime are non-discriminatory. Thus, moving from the MFN to a custom union regime is
more costly in terms of tari® revenue than moving from an FTA to a customs union. We
can then add expressions (35) and (36) to obtain the result described in Proposition 2.
7.3 Appendix C
In this appendix, we prove proposition 4. Focusing on country A, we can use expressions
(5), (12), and (23) to calculate the increase in the pro¯t of the ¯rm that produces good 1 in
country A when countries A and B move from the MFN to a customs union regime. This

















It is easy to see using a graph that changes in inequality may increase or decrease the
value of expression (37). Consider the case where c¡H equals 1. The choice of parameters
c and H is immaterial to the problem at hand. Figure 3 shows that expression (37) is (as
expected) always positive and that it can increase or decrease with variations in income
inequality.






Figure 3: Varying the extent of income inequality
a customs union regime using expression (37), and using the value of the welfare change for
that country which can be found in the proof of Proposition (2). The resulting expression













¡484 + 1925°m ¡ 1990°m2 + 32°m3 + 32°m4´
16(121 ¡ 66°m + 8°m2)
2 (38)
The solution of ¡484 + 1925°m ¡ 1990°m2 + 32°m3 + 32°m4 = 0 indicates the value for










. None of the solutions are between zero and one.
Thus, Proposition (4) concludes that customs unions will never be preferred over the MFN
regime.
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